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THE CHRISTIAN VOICE IN UKRAINIAN ELECTIONS
by Michael Bourdeaux
Canon Michael Bourdeaux is the Founder and President of Keston
Institute, Oxford. This essay consists of selections from two articles
Bourdeaux, a seasoned observer of religion in the CIS, published in
the Times of London. It is followed by the “Message from leaders of
Christian Churches” referred to, received by REE directly.
In early November last year the staff of Viktor Yushchenko, soon to be
installed as Ukraine’s new president, found a stock of some 10,000 unsigned leaflets
in an Orthodox church calling him “a partisan of the schismatics and an enemy of
Orthodoxy” and his American-born wife, Kateryna Chumachenko, a “CIA agent”.
These were on the premises of the Holy Assumption Church in BilhorodDnistrovsky, an undeveloped rural region in south-western Ukraine, adjacent to the
independent state of Moldova. Further copies were distributed in the more populous
regions around Odessa.
This was the worst, but by no means the only, instance of a church-based
scurrilous campaign against the eventual winner of the recent elections. In Kiev itself
on November 11Orthodox priests led a procession of some 2,000 people between
Ukraine’s two most ancient Christian sites, the Monastery of the Caves and St Sofia’s
Cathedral, carrying not only icons, but also political banners proclaiming anti-NATO
and anti-American slogans. This was a strong visual component in TV’s antiYushchenko campaign before the falsified election in which his rival, Viktor
Yanukovych, would prematurely claim victory.
So did the Orthodox Church take a united stand against the man who has now
been elected and who is reportedly a member of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic
Church (as is his wife)? The answer is no.
There is schism among Ukrainian Orthodox, with three separate jurisdictions
within the same territory. Before independence in 1991, the Moscow Patriarchate
stood alone in Ukraine, dominating church life there as surely as the Kremlin and
communism ruled the political sphere. Just before this, Moscow had suffered a
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devastating blow: the re-legalisation, during Mikhail Gorbachev’s last days, of the
Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the West, that part of Ukraine which had not
been under Soviet control until the westward march of the Red Army in World War
II.

In 1946 Stalin’s henchmen liquidated the church of the people there, once

designated as ‘Uniate’ – a church which celebrated the liturgy according to the
Orthodox model, had a married priesthood (though celibate bishops), but was also
fiercely loyal to the Vatican.

Moreover, it contained a nucleus of Ukrainian

nationalism. Stalin believed that by forcing the Greek Catholics to become Orthodox
and imprisoning all the bishops, he could force the people in his new territories to
transfer their loyalty to Moscow. Although some of the clergy, fearing for the lives
of their families, yielded, Stalin had buried a time bomb, which ticked away for forty
years until Gorbachev’s policies opened the way for the old wrongs to be righted.
The relations between Russia and Ukraine are infinitely complex and go back
to the 9th century. Medieval Russia emerged on the territory of what is now central
Ukraine. Kiev, a pagan city-state, grew up at the convergence of two great trade
routes, south-north (Byzantium to the Baltic) and east-west (an extension of the Silk
Road leading into the far reaches of Asia). In 988AD Kiev embraced the Orthodox
Church, taking its faith from Constantinople, an event which would indelibly mark
Russian civilisation for all time. It was called ‘Kievan Rus’ (pronounced ‘Roos’, a
Greek word for ‘fair-haired’, that is, people from the north).
In time, incursions by the Golden Horde from the East led to the collapse of
Kiev, but not of Orthodox civilisation. This migrated north, to become ‘Muscovy’,
the centre of an empire which was still expanding up to the end of the Second World
War, when the final frontiers of the Soviet Union were established, embracing not
only Russia, including Siberia, and Ukraine, but thirteen other ‘Soviet Socialist
Republics’ as well. Historically and in a very real sense, Russia and Ukraine were –
and are – one, despite Ukraine’s seizure of independence for a brief period after 1917.
But there is another, very different, story to be told. Soviet, Moscow-based,
communism betrayed its trust and treated Ukraine as a vassal state. The worst time
was in the 1930s, when Stalin collectivised agriculture, forcing the productive
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Ukrainian peasants to provide grain from their rich ‘black earth’ regions to feed
Russia, where longer frozen winters predominated.

The resultant famine killed

literally millions and it is even reckoned that more Ukrainians died as a result than
Jews in the Holocaust. Ukrainian trust in the Kremlin took a blow from which it
would never fully recover.
During the Second World War there was a dramatic change. The Nazis drove
hard into Ukraine and even captured Kiev. When the Red Army eventually repulsed
them, a new Ukrainian frontier was established far to the west. The Soviet Union
now incorporated a great swathe of what had been part of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, then Poland (after 1918). This was the region around Lviv (or Lvov, as the
Russians call it). Before annexation, this area, curiously, had become the breedingground for a new Ukrainian nationalism. Its people spoke Ukrainian (as opposed to
Russian, which predominated even in Kiev). They were also fiercely religious and
loyal to the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic (formerly called ‘Uniate’) Church.
The history of this Eastern-Rite branch of the Catholic Church is far too
complicated to describe here, but the outcome of a troubled history was that these
people practised Catholicism with what we may call an Eastern or Orthodox accent.
Their liturgy was in Slavonic, they had married clergy (but celibate bishops), but they
counted themselves among the Vatican’s most loyal subjects.
Now came Stalin’s second move against the Ukrainian people. He feared
both the religion and the Ukrainian nationalism rampant in the west. Reckoning that
he could exploit religion to divert their loyalty to the Kremlin, he abolished the
Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (with the connivance of the Moscow Patriarchate)
and forced believers to convert, literally at gun point, to Russian Orthodoxy. All the
bishops and most of the clergy objected, but faced prison and – in many instances –
death. Pro-Russian clergy replaced them and the region became, by force, a satellite
of the Moscow Patriarchate.
The suppressed Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church became, in secret, the
guardian of Ukrainian nationalism. In the 1970s and especially after the accession of
Mikhail Gorbachev Catholicism began to emerge from the shadows. Clandestinely, I
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met some of its leaders in 1988. They were utterly fearless and uncompromising in
their demands, not only for resurrection of their persecuted church, but also for
independence from the Kremlin which had betrayed them. They also made common
cause with a growing number of Ukrainian intellectuals in Kiev and elsewhere who
wanted, culturally, to reinstate a language which had also been treated as second class
by Moscow.
There are not many Catholics in the east, but there are many Orthodox in the
west. The Odessa region and the Crimea on the Black Sea are more “Russian” than
Ukrainian, but that is far from meaning that they all support the Yanukovich
platform. Far from Moscow as they are, they are coming increasingly to see – like
the large Russian minority in the Baltic States – that independence can suit them
economically, rather than being tied to Putin’s expansionist policies.
There is no ‘Orthodox Church in Ukraine’ to enjoin its faithful to cast a proMoscow vote. The Church is in triple schism: the largest segment comes under the
Moscow Patriarchate, but there is a significant pro-Ukrainian ‘Kiev Patriarchate’
(with its own separate and complicated history) and an ‘Autocephalous Orthodox
Church’, annihilated by Stalin at the take-over in the 1920s. Throw into this meltingpot the largest number of Protestants (mainly Baptists) existing anywhere on former
Soviet territory and the Muslim Crimean Tatars, trying to reclaim their historic lands
after nearly a century of persecution, and one sees a picture so complicated as to defy
resolution. Probably, the balance of religious opinion wants Ukraine to solve its own
problems without Russian interference.
The Moscow Patriarchate, in retreat, nevertheless continued to dominate the
majority of the churches in the Russian-speaking areas of Central (around Kiev) and
Eastern Ukraine. However, a strong minority established a schismatic jurisdiction,
the Kiev Patriarchate, which supported Ukrainian independence.

Yet a third

jurisdiction came into being, the Ukrainian Autocephelous Orthodox Church, which
traced its origins back to the brief years after 1917 when Ukraine was an independent
state and which was liquidated after the imposition of Soviet control. These churches
offered mostly tacit support for Yushchenko.
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However, on November 20, the day before the rigged election, the head of the
Moscow jurisdiction, Metropolitan Volodymyr, perhaps recoiling from President
Putin’s blatant interference in the process, seemed to feel a chill wind. He called on
both candidates to “stand together against those who want to sow discord” and quoted
the words of the great poet Taras Shevchenko, “Love your Ukraine and pray for it.”
Opposition voices within the Moscow jurisdiction then became stronger. In early
December three priests and a group of laymen circulated an open letter in which they
called on President Kuchma and Yanukovych to resign.
After the falsified election, events in church circles were now moving as fast
as in the political sphere. Amid the turmoil, Cardinal Lubomyr Husar, head of the
Greek-Catholic Church, pointed out on December 5 that “the root of the crisis
remains an immoral regime which has deprived the Ukrainian people of their
legitimate rights and dignity”, but ten days later his synod of bishops issued a
statesman-like call to their clergy “not to take part in election campaigning and not to
limit the rights of the faithful”.
There was one remarkable ecumenical Christian intervention from outside.
Anticipating, as it were, the visit of President Saakashvili of Georgia to congratulate
Yushchenko on 31 December, a group of three clergymen from Tbilisi occupied the
rostrum on Independence Square earlier in the month and addressed a rally. By now
Ukrainian TV was carrying the full story of the demonstrations, so the sight of these
three carried a strong message. The story behind the visit of two Georgian Orthodox
clerics, Frs Basil Kobakhidze and Zaza Tevzadze, unofficially led by the head of the
Georgian Baptist Church, Bishop Malkhaz Songulashvili, is worth an article in itself.
Suffice it to say that these men had been prominent in the movement for democracy
in Georgia a year earlier and that Bishop Malkhaz had several times suffered physical
assault from fanatical elements in the Orthodox Church.
Absent from the reports about activities on Independence Square is any
account of the significant relief work and nurture of demonstrators which the various
Protestant churches (strong in Ukraine) carried out in two tents. They called on
demonstrators not to fuel their protests with vodka. This had an effect on some of the
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Yanukovych supporters brought from Donetsk for whom strong drink was on tap.
Apparently, some listened to the message, even its Christian content. The three most
senior Protestant leaders (of different churches) co-signed a statement on December 2
condemning the falsification of the recent election results. They were joined by
Cardinal Husar and Patriarch Filaret, head of the Kiev Patriarchate, in an
unprecedented ecumenical gesture. Protestant leaders also offered prayers from the
platform on December 5.
The Moscow Patriarchate, like Putin himself, has lost an immense amount of
face. Patriarch Alexi II in Moscow issued a defensive statement last week in which
he said, “I expect the new President of Ukraine will have enough wisdom to go the
way of unity and not confrontation” – which is being interpreted in Kiev as both
directive and patronising.

Authoritarianism has taken a sharp blow, while

independent Christian voices have shown themselves both moderate and effective,
raising their stock in Ukrainian society.
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ELECTIONS IN UKRAINE: A MESSAGE FROM THE LEADERS OF THE
CHRISTIAN CHURCHES OF UKRAINE [December 2, 2004]
Dear Brothers and Sisters! Respected fellow citizens!
Having received the preliminary results of the presidential election of Ukraine
through the mass media, which [i.e. preliminary election results] have elicited mass
acts of protest unprecedented in our country, with the participation of hundreds of
thousands of our countrymen, a significant number of whom are young, which is
especially evident in Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, we consider it our pastoral and civic
responsibility to state the following.
The Church has always been with the people, both in times of joy and in times
of testing. Therefore, at this time, when Ukraine is standing before the choice
concerning its future - democratic or authoritarian - when unity and even the
independence of our native land are threatened, the Church is with the people.
We, as leaders of Christian churches of Ukraine and as citizens of our native
land, are concerned by the unjust way the election campaign [has gone] and
especially by the massive falsification of the results.
The Church is called to witness to the truth, to preach love and peace, and that
means that [the Church] cannot agree with untruth.
Therefore, first of all, we appeal to believers to fast and pray for peace in our
country and for the realization of correct [just, fair] results in the presidential election.
We call our congregations and all the Ukrainian people to stand up for the
truth, preserve unity and civic peace, hold to the constitution and laws of Ukraine,
and not give way to violence.
We appeal to the authorities, especially to those that answer for the true
realization of the people's will, and also to the higher and local courts, with a call to
remember their responsibility before God in order that they may fulfill the
responsibilities placed on them by the people of Ukraine.
We are convinced that the people of Ukraine will wisely and honorably
endure the present time of testing. Truth is undefeatable! We ask for God's blessing
on all our fellow citizens.
Filaret, Patriarch of Kiev and all Rus-Ukraine [Kiev Patriarchate]
Lyubomir, Supreme Archbishop, Ukraine Greko-Catholic Church
Mikhail Panochko, Bishop, Church of Christians of Evangelical Faith of Ukraine
[Pentecostal,]
Markirian Trofimiak, Deputy Chair of Conference of Roman Catholic Bishops in
Ukraine
Leonid Padun, Senior Bishop, Ukrainian Christian Evangelical Church
Viacheslav Gorpinchuk, Bishop, Ukrainian Lutheran Church
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